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March 30, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Intelligence Support for Psychological Warfare

25X1 [] from Jim Reber's shop came in Wednesday to discuss intelligence for psychological warfare. He is trying to clarify the problem through discussion with people in various agencies in the hope of finding a solution to the problem which is harrasing so many people. We both agreed that clarification of the problem would probably be the major step in the solution. He is also interested in identifying what is the proper role of the DCI in psychological warfare intelligence.

The following outline stems from the discussion but does not necessarily represent the views of []

25X1

1. The problem of intelligence support for psychological warfare can be divided into consideration of the question of the provision of intelligence to the instruments of PW (including the top Psychological Warfare Strategy Board), on the one hand, and, on the other, the coordination which may be required for any intelligence activity bearing on psychological warfare.

With Respect to the Provision of Intelligence

1. One can identify four categories of intelligence material needed by the instruments of PW:

✓ a. Current intelligence, which is the sum total of all raw, spot intelligence information from all sources which may be used by PW people, and includes State Department telegrams, OSO reports, [] etc.

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✓ b. Intelligence reports and estimates, which would include assembled and evaluated intelligence reports of particular use to PW; such as, for instance, reactions to events or speeches, analysis of certain country targets etc.

✓ c. Research reports, prepared in government agencies, government-supported institutions (OSO, etc.) and private institutions.

d. Technical

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✓ d. Technical intelligence, notably the intelligence information, both raw and evaluated on such subjects as jamming, etc.

2. The actual intelligence in each of the above categories prepared for use in PW planning or operations is, in fact, no different from intelligence of a military, sociological, and particularly political nature prepared in support of other activities, such as foreign policy, except that it must be oriented to the particular uses of PW. Thus, PW instruments need the same telegrams and raw intelligence, the same type of intelligence estimates, research reports and technical analyses although in each case that must be directed to PW uses.

✓ 3. Following upon this, the decisions taken in recent months with respect to the provision of intelligence support for PW are imminently sound, namely, that intelligence will be provided for PW in accordance with the over-all directives for the delineation of responsibility for such areas. Any alternative which looked to one agency to supply intelligence would mean that that agency would either have to be a supernumerary element between the consumer and the producer or would need to develop itself a producing staff which could not help but duplicate existing staffs in other agencies.

✓ 4. Each PW instrument, whether VOA, CIA or the military must have someone to whom it can look and hold accountable for the provision of intelligence. With the exception of the new top FFB, each instrument has within its agency an intelligence arm to which it can look for its intelligence needs including intelligence from other agencies. Thus military needs can be passed through service intelligence agencies or JIG to State Department, and from VOA through R to military agencies. CIA can get its intelligence support directly from the Department or military agencies.

Support for
PWS

5. More complex but far from insoluble is the problem: To whom does the Director of the new PW staff look for his intelligence support? There seems to be no reason why he would not be in a position to get it from the producing agencies directly or at least through the representatives on the top FWB, namely, Webb-Barrett for political-PW intelligence, Lovett-JIG for military-PW intelligence, and Smith for covert-PW intelligence. There seems to be a prevalent but questionable sound view that the director of the top FWB must and should look to one agency for the provision of his intelligence needs. Obviously, if such a suggestion is

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adopted CIA would be that agency, and yet it is difficult to see what CIA would add itself to the provision of such intelligence; instead, unless it has itself a producing unit, it would merely simply passing it on to the actual producer who would be better off if he were in direct contact with the consumer. This applies with the exception of NIE's, which presumably the top FWB could at any time get through General Smith, but surely this represents a very small fraction of their intelligence needs. (General Magruder disagrees with the views expressed in this paragraph and believes that the top FWB director must be able to look to one agency for the provision of his intelligence even though that agency simply serves as a mail box. General Magruder has some idea that JCS staff (OOI ?) would add something or will treat all FW intelligence as it would NIE's.)

6. It would seem to be indicated that the director of the top FWB would need to have a staff member, directly responsible to him and not from another agency, who can, even as a bureau intelligence adviser, arrange for and assist in getting the appropriate intelligence from the various agencies.

With Respect to Coordination

2. The coordination of intelligence support for FW has two phases, frequently confused, neither of which seem either large or too complicated: The coordination on any individual intelligence report, which is to say collaboration between two agencies on a single report (other than an NIE which has its established procedures); and the coordination of intelligence activities, as distinct from production of individual reports.

2. There should be no difficulty in bringing together on a collaborative basis more than one agency in the production of an intelligence report; in fact, such collaboration takes place, quite apart from NIE's, on normal intelligence production. Thus a report primarily military but with political implications can be handled by the military with assistance from the Department, and, vice versa, for a report primarily political with military implications. Any staff officer for the director of FW could assist, even as do policy officers, that a report be prepared in collaboration with other agencies. It is difficult to identify any need for instituting a special and unquestionably duplicatory mechanism to effect such collaborative coordination in the production of individual intelligence reports in support of FW.

3. The coordination of intelligence activities which bear on FW does not seem to present a major problem because there seem to be very few, nor an insoluble problem because there exist already methods with CIA and the IAC for effecting such coordination.

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Furthermore, it is difficult to identify any coordination problem bearing exclusively on PW which would not already be a subject of the existing coordinating procedures.

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